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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
GUEST LECTURE AT THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
19 JANUARY 2004, THE HAGUE
SYDNEY M. CONE, 111*
I. A LOOK AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
In the context of the early stages of the International Criminal
Court as a supranational institution,1 it may be instructive to look at
an established multilateral juridical institution, particularly where a
substantial body of history and jurisprudence is available for consid-
eration, and above all where the other institution seems to have
developed a supportive constituency in the international commu-
nity. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is such an institution.2
While the types of crimes specified in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court3 are but infrequently related to issues
that come before the WTO, both institutions share a common need
to develop political and diplomatic skills that will help them to es-
tablish and maintain global credibility. The WTO deals with dis-
putes involving mainly trade and (to a lesser extent) cross-border
investment, and the cross-border licensing of intellectual property;
* C.V. Starr Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Law, New
York Law School; Senior Counsel, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton.
1. For general materials see International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers,
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/php/show.php?id=faq (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
2. Basic texts relating to the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be found at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal e/legal-e.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
They include the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and, annexed
thereto, a number of multilateral agreements on matters that include trade in goods
(GATT 1994), trade in services (CATS), dispute settlement (the DSU), investment
(TRIMS), intellectual property (TRIPS).
3. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) as corrected by later procls-verbaux; it en-
tered into force on July 1, 2002 (hereinafter the Rome Statute). At present it grants the
International Criminal Court jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes.
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in other words, disputes in the realm of international economic
law-as distinguished from criminal law. Also, the WTO deals with
disputes between its member countries-as distinguished from
prosecutions of individual criminal defendants. 4 Arguably, the
work of the WTO is less fraught with tensions than is the trial of
persons accused of genocide or crimes against humanity or war
crimes. Even so, the economic realm is rife with national jealousies
and protectionist distrust of intermeddling by unelected interna-
tional civil servants.5 The WTO thus may merit attention, because
it seems to have been successful in developing the broad-based
transnational acceptance manifesting, or at least not inconsistent
with, the consensus that it needs in order successfully to handle
difficult and seriously contested controversies in which substantial
economic interests are at stake.
It was not always thus in the sphere of international trade. The
WTO was painfully slow in coming into existence. The negotiation
of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization was
every bit as tortuous-as plagued by crises, set-backs and dead-
locks-as the negotiation of the Rome Statute.6 Indeed, if we go
back to the negotiation and failed ratification of the Havana Char-
ter-the Charter of the International Trade Organization-some
56 years ago,7 we can come to appreciate the range of talent and
the qualities of character, including just plain patience, that go into
creating an effective supranational tribunal.
In the beginning there was GATT, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Although its principal provisions and its great
body of jurisprudence are still with us at the core of the WTO, it
began modestly and it grew as a fragile enterprise beset with risk.
Its long, incremental evolution took place at times in fits and starts,
at times through organized rounds of negotiations. As originally
conceived, the GATT was supposed to be administered by the Inter-
4. See generally The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Aug. 1995) [hereinaf-
ter WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures].
5. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 42-44 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2002).
6. Compare id., at 61-67, with HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MYrHS AND FACTS ABOUT THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT; and QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE ICC AND THE
UNITED STATES, both available at http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/us.htm (last visited
Mar. 1, 2004).
7. See LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 23-26.
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national Trade Organization; however, the ITO Charter was effec-
tively rejected by the Government of the United States of America,
among other countries-does this sound familiar?-and the ITO
never came into existence. The GATT remained an orphan for al-
most half a century, until it was finally integrated into the WTO in
January 1995. During its long orphanage, the GATT was a mere
provisional agreement that was never ratified. Unlike the WTO to-
day, the GATT was not a juridical entity. Institutionally, it was a
staff based in Geneva for the purpose of administering the contrac-
tual GATT, a staff of international civil servants engaged by the
countries called the contracting parties that had signed (but not
ratified) this provisional agreement.8
The international civil servants who staffed this adventitious
non-entity proved themselves to be very useful. They emphasized
diplomacy. Indeed, for a long time-as it turned out, for too long a
time-the GATT did not have a legal department. The contracting
parties, aided by the staff in Geneva, developed what has been
called "diplomats' jurisprudence." Terminology was important-
and to this day remains important in the context of the WTO. At
an early stage, disputes between contracting parties were referred
to "working parties" for resolution, and they issued "reports" that
made "recommendations." Thus, even when the proceedings had
the effect of binding the disputing parties to a decision by a tribu-
nal, crisp judicial terminology was avoided in favor of purposefully
precatory diplomatic phraseology. In time, the "working parties"
came to be called "panels," which is still the term for courts of first
instance in the WTO dispute-settlement system.9
Of course, the analogy to the circumspection of the early
GATT is not intended for literal application by the International
Criminal Court in specific penal cases. The studied language of a
"recommendation" deferentially addressed to a nation-state may
not be susceptible of adaptation to a decision relating to an individ-
ual accused of a specific crime against humanity. Nevertheless, the
analogy may still be apposite as a matter of general institutional
culture, as a matter of appreciating the relationship to be devel-
8. See ROBERT E. HUDEC, Enforcing INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM 3-10 (Butterworth Legal Publ. 1993).
9. Id. at 11-15.
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oped between a supranational criminal court, on the one hand,
and, on the other, the states that created it and on which it is alto-
gether dependent. This dependency exists not only in operational
areas such as obtaining evidence and carrying out sentences im-
posed on persons whom the court has found guilty,10 but also with
regard to the fundamental necessity of building and retaining the
confidence of the international community that the court is acting
wisely and constructively in its administration of criminal justice.
The policy of the institutional GATT to conduct its juridical
proceedings as exercises in diplomacy was modified when the ab-
sence of a legal department became an obvious and threatening
problem. For many years, beginning in 1972, the staff of the insti-
tutional GATT had failed to deal competently with a controversy
involving corporate income tax provisions that had been adopted
by the United States and which certain European countries had
claimed were illegal export subsidies under the relevant provisions
of the contractual GATT. This failure ultimately persuaded the in-
stitutional GATT to add lawyers to its staff, a step that marked the
turning of GATT dispute settlement into a process based on legal
skills as well as diplomacy.'" The handling of the actual dispute was
notable not only for giving rise to improvements in the way the in-
stitutional GATT functioned, but also for establishing an institu-
tional commitment, through year after year of setbacks and
frustrations, to adjudicating legal claims until they were eventually
decided by resorting to precedent, legal analysis, and diplomacy.
The ups and downs of the GATT in the years preceding the
WTO put to the test the development of a multilateral institution
capable of resolving disputes. There was no master plan that had
been laid out in advance. Unforeseeable problems arose, and at
times individual governments responded to them in ways that were
beyond multilateral control. The results were not always tidy but,
overall, they produced a substantial body of case-by-case experience
and a functioning, indeed, a valuable process for the settlement of
disputes. The contracting parties and the staff in Geneva learned
10. On the role of States Parties as regards obtaining evidence and carrying out
sentences, see the Rome Statute, supra note 3, at pts. 9-10.




to build an institution out of a quantity of routine cases, to survive
major setbacks, and in the case of a bad result, to avoid paralysis
and move on to the next problem. 12
By means of a binding international agreement called the Un-
derstanding on Dispute Settlement, or DSU, 13 the WTO dispute-
settlement system is expressly grounded in the jurisprudence devel-
oped under the institutional GATT. The DSU, which confers sub-
stantial judicial authority on organs of the WTO, was not separately
submitted to the nations of the world for ratification. Rather, it was
annexed to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, and the (to date) 148 countries that have ratified that agree-
ment have, by the terms thereof, ipso facto ratified the documents
annexed thereto, among them the DSU. As mentioned, courts of
first instance under the DSU are called panels. Under the DSU,
appeals of panel reports may be made to a tribunal which is called
neither tribunal nor court-but has the bland name of Appellate
Body. 14 It has seven members. The blandness of its name belies its
substantial power. Some writers on international law have called
the Appellate Body the most powerful multilateral tribunal ever
established. 15
In theory, the Appellate Body and the panels are subordinate
to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), comprising all 148 members
of the WTO on a one-member-one-vote basis-not unlike the As-
sembly of States Parties to the Statute of Rome. A report by the
Appellate Body, or a report by a panel which is not appealed, takes
effect when it has been approved by the DSB. Under the DSU, the
DSB must act no later than a fixed time on a report submitted to it,
and the report is approved unless the members of the DSB unani-
mously disapprove it. Since the prevailing party in a dispute (as well
as other countries supporting the prevailing party) is unlikely to
disapprove a report favorable to it, the DSB is unlikely ever to disap-
12. See id. at 176-77.
13. See WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra note 4; see also supra text ac-
companying note 2.
14. See WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra note 4, at Art. 17.
15. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 150 ("The most complete system of inter-
national dispute resolution in history.").
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prove a report. For this reason, the Appellate Body, as a practical
matter, is the court of last resort in the WTO system.16
The WTO generally, and the Appellate Body in particular, ex-
ist in a world of political danger, constantly called upon to take
account of their vulnerability to hostile views inherent in domestic
national politics. The discreet and adroit cultivation of domestic
support and its counterparts-avoidance of gratuitous provocation,
and gauging expressions of disaffection by various interests, govern-
mental and non-governmental-are on-going aspects of building a
supranational institution. It may be appropriate for scholars to
comment on the power of the Appellate Body, but the Appellate
Body itself might be well-advised to remember that, poorly man-
aged, power can prove ephemeral.
Moreover, some problems do not get solved forever. The dis-
pute mentioned above between the United States and certain Euro-
pean countries over export subsidies alleged to exist in U.S.
corporate income tax law has resurfaced and involves very substan-
tial sums of money. 17 It is not the most tractable of problems, and
the WTO may be called upon not only to provide legal rulings but
also to help its two most powerful members, the United States and
the European Union, to employ diplomacy in order to avoid major
harm in the global arena.
Another problem that has confronted the W-TO is the proper
role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in dispute settle-
ment. Industrialized nations have tended to favor the admissibility
of briefs submitted by NGOs to W/TO panels and the Appellate
Body. Developing countries, on the other hand, have tended to
view NGOs as unwelcome manifestations of the industrialized
world, and have sought to exclude them from WTO dispute-settle-
ment proceedings.' 8 It seems quite possible that the International
16. For a discussion of this process, see Sydney M. Cone, III, The Asbestos Case and
Dispute Settlement In The World Trade Organization: The Uneasy Relationship Between Panels
and The Appellate Body, 23 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 103, 103-07 (2001).
17. Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Tax Treatment for "Foreign Sales
Corporations," WT/DSI08/AB/R (Feb. 24, 2000).
18. For a discussion of Non-Governmental Organizations and WTO dispute settle-
ment, see Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbes-
tos and Asbestos-Containing Products, § III ("Preliminary Procedural Matter"), ATrr/
DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001).
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Criminal Court will not face this dilemma in similarly acute form,
and will be able to involve NGOs constructively in its work.
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION
In entering into an international agreement, nations com-
monly reserve the right to subordinate certain provisions of the
agreement to a national-security exception, a right entitling each
nation to place its national-security interests ahead of specified mul-
tilateral obligations. The exception in the GATT is quite broad;
according to its Article XXI, nothing in that agreement is to pre-
vent a contracting party from taking any action "which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests." The
national-security exception in the Rome Statute is much narrower;
under its Articles 72 and 93, a State Party is entitled to invoke its
national security as a ground for denying a request by the Interna-
tional Criminal Court for the production of documents or the dis-
closure of evidence.
Although the national-security exception in the Rome Statute
is relatively narrow, it could in theory be used to inhibit the work of
the Court rather seriously. In order to gather documents and other
evidence, the agents of the Court are singularly dependent on ob-
taining the co-operation of the national criminal and law-enforce-
ment authorities of the respective States Parties to the Statute. Of
course, in the event of non-co-operation, the agents of the Court,
through diplomacy or otherwise, may find practical solutions that
would yield documents or evidence from sources that are helpful or
at least not subject to crippling interference. Even so, the question
might be asked whether there is a major practical risk that national
authorities will withhold their assistance on grounds of national
security.
An oblique answer to this question may be found by ascertain-
ing what use nations have made of the broad national-security ex-
ception in the GATT over the long life of that agreement.
Although it could have been feared that that exception would be
invoked so frequently and so indiscriminately as to eviscerate the
agreement itself, the history of the GATT reveals that its contracting
parties and (more recently) the WTO member states have had re-
course to the national-security exception but rarely, and only when
2004]
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there was at least a colorable argument that related to actual or
threatened hostilities between states.
The Falklands/Malvinas conflict was one occasion when claims
of national security were invoked under the GATT; the combatants
and certain of their allies took this step in order, in effect, to sup-
plement their shooting war with a trade war. One might question
whether the war was of such gravity as to justify the suspension of
obligations under the GAT by particular nations. 19 In the event,
the suspension was limited in time, and the countries involved
elected not to parlay the suspension into a major controversy.
Another occasion when claims relating to national security
were talked of in the context of the GATT was enactment by the
United States of legislation known as the Helms-Burton Act,20 the
purpose of which was to punish, or at least bring pressure to bear
on, Cuba after its air force had shot down an aircraft identified with
a dissident movement. For a while it looked as though U.S. trade
and investment policy toward Cuba falling within the ambit of the
WTO would seriously disrupt relations within the WTO. Threats
were made but stopped short of irretrievable action. Time passed.
The European Union, Canada and Mexico (that is, the aggrieved
WTO members other than Cuba) allowed diplomacy to soften out-
raged calls for confrontation, and some of the more questionable
provisions of Helms-Burton were kept in a state of suspension by
the United States. In the end, the United States was forced neither
to back down nor to invoke Article XXI of the GATT. 21
If use of GATT's national-security exception can be taken as a
guide, then the national-security exception in the Rome Statute
may turn out to be a provision that, generally speaking, will not be
abused. In addition, if there are times when abuse might be
claimed, the GATT/WTO example suggests that a wise course of
action might be to allow time for tempers to cool, and to seek not
confrontation but a diplomatic solution.
19. See RAj BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 601, 603 (2d
ed. 2001).
20. Cuban Liberty And Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act Of 1996, 22 U.S.C.
§ 6021 (2004) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
21. On threatened U.S. invocation of Art. XXI, see Nancy Dunne and Guy de
Joncquiires, US and EU set to resume Cuba talks, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at 3.
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III. THE UNITED STATES AND "AGGRESSIVE UNILATERALISM"
Beginning in 1988, that is, roughly during the period when the
Uruguay Round negotiations were taking place but before it was
known that they would result in the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, the United States embarked on trade
and trade-related policies that have been dubbed "aggressive uni-
lateralism"22-a term that might (perhaps in a gesture of generos-
ity) be applied to current United States policy in respect of the
Rome Statute. As regards the multilateral agreements administered
by the WTO, the United States, to a certain extent, has recognized
that those agreements take priority over unilateral measures
adopted by the United States in the pre-WTO years of U.S. "aggres-
sive unilateralism." At best, "aggressive unilateralism" can be
credited with having helped to promote the creation of the WTO.
At worst, the United States does not seem indifferent to the goal of
harmonizing its unilateral measures with the relevant multilateral
agreements.
What, if anything, does the history of U.S. "aggressive unilater-
alism" presage for relations between the United States and the
States Parties to the Rome Statute, not to mention the International
Criminal Court itself? For the moment, no useful answer seems
available to that question.
For what it may be worth, there is a development in U.S. pri-
vate law that may prove relevant to crimes under the Court's juris-
diction-genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. This
development is found in certain cases in tort brought under the
U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act.23 Only last month was the way cleared
for claims under the Act to be heard by, and a definitive evaluation
of these types of claims must await decisions by, the U.S. Supreme
Court.
2 4
The U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act was included in the first U.S.
statute on the judiciary, enacted in 1789, and confers upon U.S.
federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
22. LOWENFELD, supra note 5, at 148-49.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003).
24. See Linda Greenhouse, Reviewing Foreigners' Use of Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 2003, at A29. See also N.Y.L. ScH. CTR. INT'L. L., The International Review, Fall
2003, at 12.
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alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or
a treaty of the United States." Beginning with a decision by the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1980, case law
has developed in the U.S. federal courts to the effect that "the law
of nations" may include certain norms of public international law
relating to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.2 5 As
a result, if an "alien" (a person not a citizen or national of the
United States) can establish tortious injury arising from a violation
of the "law of nations" thus defined, the alien may be able to obtain
redress in a private tort action in a U.S. federal district court.
To repeat, the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to issue a decision
in this area. In addition, the decided cases have not established
clear guidelines on when a corporate (as distinguished from an in-
dividual) defendant can be held liable under the Act, or the extent
of complicity by a state that a plaintiff must show, or the extent to
which a state may be immune from suit. The decided cases do indi-
cate that the "law of nations" is to be construed strictly, and that a
plaintiff has a substantial burden in establishing that a claimed
norm of public international law is one a violation of which entitles
the plaintiff to redress in an action in tort under the Act. Briefly
put, under the court decisions to date, such a norm must be shown
to be a universal, definable and obligatory norm in order for it to
rise to the level of the "law of nations."
At the moment the most that can be said is that the U.S. Alien
Tort Claims Act may prove relevant. The possibility exists that the
International Criminal Court may see the development of some pri-
vate court-made law in the United States that could bear on the
Court's consideration of the crimes under its jurisdiction. Such a
development, to the extent that it actually takes place, might give a
new dimension to the term "aggressive unilateralism" as fostered in
the United States.
IV. A CONCLUDING LOOK AT THE LODESTONE
OF THE RULE OF LAW
Both the original GATT and the WTO were designed to bring
the rule of law into areas of transnational economic endeavor
25. See, e.g., Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2003).
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where, hitherto, there had been autarky, beggar-thy-neighbor poli-
cies, and the uncertainties attendant upon an absence of agreed
multilateral standards to govern trade, (and, latterly) investment
and the protection of intellectual property. Generally speaking, a
consensus was attainable as to the need for or desirability of agreed
multilateral standards. The substantive areas to be covered by them
were more controversial, however; and, over time, as new areas
were put forward for inclusion in the search for the rule of interna-
tional economic law, the controversy tended to become more com-
plex. Basically, there have been increasing tensions concerning the
types and content of legal standards to be adopted as the classical
views of industrialized nations have been challenged by (nations
purporting to speak for) the developing world.26
Does one dare to be so bold as to look for useful lessons appli-
cable to the rather different sphere of law under the jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court? Tentatively, two thoughts might
be advanced. The first is that an international consensus may be
within reach on the proposition that all legitimate spheres of
human endeavor would greatly benefit to the extent that the multi-
lateral rule of law, in the form of agreed, enforceable and enforced
multilateral standards, were to be strengthened in a manner that
would diminish recourse to criminal behavior. The second is that
ipse dixit is unlikely to produce significant useful results; that much
energy, resourcefulness and patience will have to go into the devel-
opment of standards that will advance the cause of criminal justice
and, at the same time, not run afoul of a multiplicity of political,
social and economic agendas. The Court faces the daunting task of
building a credible jurisprudence out of individual cases and, simul-
taneously, playing a major role in the never-ending task of trans-
forming the Rome Statute into a relevant, living document.
It may be premature to discuss in a concrete fashion how the
Court's legal and diplomatic skills will be applied. Even so, the cre-
ation by the Court's Prosecutor of a division responsible for juris-
diction, complementarity and international co-operation suggests
26. For general reading in this area, see RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2000); see also Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights Law in Prac-
tice, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 101 (2001); Guy Lesser, War Crime and Punishment, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1, 2004, at 37.
2004]
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW
an early focus on developing and applying the Rome Statute's pred-
icate provisions that recognize the complementary competence of
the States Parties and the Court itself.27 Thus, in carrying out the
Statute, the Prosecutor will need not only to weigh evidence that a
prosecutable crime (genocide, a crime against humanity, a war
crime) has occurred, but also to ascertain whether the authorities
of the relevant States Parties are able and willing to prosecute. This
double process may at times be interactive, and a determination as
to criminal evidence may inform certain decisions as to the identity
of the authority that will be responsible for prosecutorial action.
This process (aptly adumbrated by the Prosecutor's administrative
rubric of jurisdiction, complementarity and co-operation) can be
expected to blend legal analysis with diplomatic interchange. To a
certain degree, then, the GATT/WTO history discussed above may
serve as helpful background material for policy-makers charged
with enforcing the Rome Statute.
27. See generally The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Informal expert paper: The principle of complementarity in practice (2003), available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/otp/complementarity.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
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